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THE USE OF MINERAL INTERESTS IN SHORT-TERM




T HE short-term trust is today a widely used implement among
the tools of the income tax planner.' It is generally used most
effectively where the potential grantor can look forward to at least
ten years of substantial earnings, but does not believe that he can
afford to part with his property indefinitely.! Such a person can
transfer property in trust for the life of the beneficiary or ten years,
whichever is less, with a reversion of the corpus to him.' The in-
come may be accumulated for the beneficiary for the term or dis-
tributed currently.4 These trusts are often used to provide for aged
relatives or a fund for the children's education. For example, if
a person is in the fifty per cent bracket and has property which
produces $3,000 of annual income, he retains only $1,500 after taxes.
If this same person were to transfer the property into three separate
trusts for his three children, with at least $650 of the income dis-
tributable annually to each child, the children would pay no tax
because of the $600 exemption' and the ten per cent standard de-
duction.' In addition, each trust would have an exemption of $100
each year.' Consequently, the $650 distributed to each child, plus
the $100 exemption for each trust, or a total of $2,250 escapes taxa-
*B.A., LL.B., University of Oklahoma; Attorney at Law, Ft. Worth, Texas.
'For excellent discussions on the problems involved in the use of the short-term trust
see the following: Craven, Practical Uses and Problems of Short Term Trusts, N.Y.U.
16th Annual Inst. on Fed. Tax. 903 (1958); Grotheer, Pitfalls in Short Term Trusts, 98
Trusts & Estates 12 (1959); Johnson, Trusts and the Grantor, 36 Taxes 869 (1958);
Mansfield, Short Term Trusts and the Clifford Rules, N.Y.U. 15th Annual Inst. on Fed.
Tax. 837 (1957); Yohlin, The Short-Term Trust-A Respectable Tax-Saving Device, 14
Tax L. Rev. 109 (1958).
'The short-term trust is principally an income tax saving device and has only inci-
dental estate tax consequences. If the person in question has a substantial estate, he would
probably make gifts of the property and retain no reversion in order to effect estate tax
savings as well as to avoid future income.
a Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 673 (a) provides that the grantor shall be treated as the
owner of any portion of a trust in which he has a reversionary interest which may rea-
sonably be expected to take effect within ten years from the date of transfer.
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 674(b)(6).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 151(b).
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 144.
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 642(b). If the trust under its governing instrument is
required to distribute currently all of its income for the taxable year, the exemption is
$300.
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tion. The tax on the remaining $750 would be about $150 as com-
pared to $1,500 in the grantor's hands, or a saving of $1,350. After
ten years the corpus could revert to the grantor and the children's
college fund would be better off by approximately $13,500.
Where the transfer is to a trust with the income payable for cer-
tain charitable purposes, the term of the trust need be only two
years s Since the taxpayer is not taxed on any of the income during
the term,' it has the effect of increasing his thirty per cent charitable
deduction by the amount of that income each year. If the corpus
reverts to the grantor after the two years, he gets no deduction for
the value of the income right transferred." However, at least for
the present, if the remainder is distributable to some other person,
the grantor could also deduct the value of the charitable gift.'1
This discussion should serve to illustrate the importance of short-
term trusts and the statutory provisions" which control their tax
effects. It is not the purpose of this Article to delve into the many
requirements which must be met to satisfy the statutory provisions.
It should suffice to say that they are complex and demanding of the
draftsman.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The use of the short-term trust as a stable tax-planning technique
is the result of a long history. The cases on this point are legion,"
and the courts have time and time again weighed the facts and
drawn the line between what constituted the assignment of income,
taxable to the grantor, and what constituted a transfer of property,
taxable to the grantee. In an effort to curb this flood of litigation
by drawing an arbitrary line, the Treasury issued the Clifford Regu-
lations.14 When doubt was cast upon their validity," Congress pre-
sumably settled the issue by outlining in detail what was necessary
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 673(b).
°Treas. Reg. § 1.673(b)-I (1956).
a1°nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(b) (1) (D).
"Section 9 of the Technical Amendments Bill of 1958 (H.R. 8381) as passed by the
House of Representatives would have foreclosed the deduction if the remainder were to
certain members of the grantor's family, but it was rejected by the Senate.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 671-78.
" For discussion see 6 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation 5 37.39 n.62 (1957); Cleary,
The Clifford Regulations Reexamined, N.Y.U. 12th Annual Inst. on Fed. Tax. 741, 746
(1954); Greenberger, Changes in the Income Taxation of Clifford Type Trusts, N.Y.U.
13th Annual Inst. on Fed. Tax. 165 (1955); Holland, Kennedy, Surrey, and Warren, A
Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Trusts and Estates-American
Law Institute Draft, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 316, 358 (1953).
1426 C.F.R. § 29.22(a)-21, 22 (1949).
"See Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 100 (7th Cir. 1953).
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for a grantor to avoid being taxed on income received by the grantee
from the property transferred."6 In view of this, tax practitioners
had every reason to believe that this problem had finally been laid to
rest. Yet recent actions of the Revenue Service have caused this rest
to be uneasy.
This cause for apprehension arose in the form of a private ruling
which held that a grantor who transferred his entire interest in cer-
tain oil and gas properties to a short-term trust for more than ten
years or the life of the beneficiary, whichever is the lesser period,
with a reversion to the grantor, would be taxed upon the income
produced by the property and received by the beneficiary." The the-
ory upon which the ruling was based is that such an assignment is
equivalent to the assignment of a "carved out" production payment
and hence an assignment of income taxable to the grantor, unless
it can be shown that the term of the trust would extend over the
entire depletable life of the property, i.e., that the minerals would
be exhausted before the trust terminated. "
At first glance one might be inclined to think that this recent pro-
nouncement is a result of the Service's having obtained a key to in-
creased revenue in the form of Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.;"9
however, a closer scrutiny may demonstrate that the theoretical basis
of this ruling is strong enough to persist and harass the tax planner.
Because this is a very important planning area, it would seem ad-
visable to examine this problem to see what logic prompted the rul-
ing, to determine if the ruling is a correct statement of the law, and
if so, to ascertain whether such a law is fair and just in the light of
a critical analysis. In seeking to accomplish this purpose, the follow-
ing factors will be analyzed: reasons for the Service's position, cases
bearing upon the assignment of income problem generally, the Clif-
ford case and the Grantor Trusts Provisions (sections 671-78 of the
Code), the carved-out oil payment, and the definitional problem.
III. REASONS FOR THE SERVICE'S POSITION
The taxpayer was advised, after making his initial request for the
ruling, that because the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in the
Lake case, no ruling would be issued pending the outcome of that
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5§ 671-78.
" For references to the private ruling, see Jewett, Estate and Gift Tax Consequences
of Oil and Gas Ventures, Southwestern Legal Foundation 10th Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas
L. & Tax. 389, 399 (1959); Johnson, Tax Problems of an Operator of Oil and Gas Prop-
erties, 1959 Ill. L. Forum 615, 628.
" See Johnson, supra note 17, at 628.
" 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
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case. After the decision was forthcoming, the request was renewed
and the ruling under discussion was issued. This sequence of events
gives some indication of the Service's position.
If the Service believed the Grantor Trusts Provisions applied to
the proposed transfer to the trust of all of the taxpayer's interest in
the mineral property, the Service would have issued a favorable rul-
ing or else have shown wherein the terms of this trust violated the
provisions and required the taxation of the income to the grantor."
Also, the refusal to rule pending the Lake decision and the discussion
in the ruling of G.C.M. 24849"1 and I.T. 400322 would have been un-
necessary since neither applies to the statutory requirements. There-
fore, this ruling apparently means that the Service feels the Grantor
Trusts Provisions do not apply where the property transferred is
any kind of mineral interest with a depletable life that will exceed
the term of the trust.
One of the principal reasons for the Service's ruling probably
stems from the decision of the Supreme Court in the Lake case.
There, the Court held that the consideration received for the trans-
fer of certain carved-out production payments was taxable as ordi-
nary income and not taxable at capital gains rates. The Court was
of the opinion that the transfers were anticipatory assignments of
income and not the transfer of capital assets. In reaching its decision
the Court cited I.T. 4003, which held that the assignment of an
in-oil payment right which extends over a period of less than the
life of the depletable interest from which it is carved is an anticipa-
tory assignment of income.2"
The Service stated that since under the facts of the requested rul-
ing it was not shown that the minerals would be exhausted before
the trust terminated, it was equivalent to a carved-out production
payment even though it was recognized that the taxpayer proposed
to transfer all his interest to the trust, retaining only a reversion
after the term.
Since Congress has enacted specific statutes governing the tax con-
sequences of transfers of income-producing property in trust, these
provisions would presumably control. To avoid this conclusion, it
would seem the Service must have some reason for denying the ap-
plication of these statutes. This reason is probably found in the
language of the regulations under section 671, which provides in part
as follows:
20 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 671-78.
21 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 66.
22 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 10.
23 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 66, 69.
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However, the provisions of Sections 671-678 do not apply in situations
involving an assignment of future income, whether or not the assign-
ment is to a trust. Thus, for example, a person who assigns his rights to
future income under an employment contract may be taxed on that
income even though the assignment is to a trust over which the assignor
has retained none of the controls specified in Sections 671-677. Similarly,
a bondholder who assigns his right to interest may be taxed on interest
payments even though the assignment is to an uncontrolled trust.24
This regulation in turn appears to be derived from a discussion of
section 671 in the Committee Reports:
Thus, this subpart has no application in situations involving assign-
ments of future income to the assignor as in Lucas v. Earl (281 U.S.
111), Harrison v. Schaffner (312 U.S. 579) and Helvering v. Horst
(311 U.S. 112), whether or not the assignment is to a trust....
Consequently, under the Service's views, if such a transfer is an
assignment of income, it is taxable to the grantor under the Lake
decision since the Grantor Trusts Provisions do not apply where
an assignment of income is involved.
These, then, are the principal reasons underlying the Service's
position: First, such a transfer by a grantor of all his mineral prop-
erty to a short-term trust with a reversion in the grantor after the
term is equivalent to an oil payment and is an anticipatory assign-
ment of income taxable to the grantor; and, second, the Grantor
Trusts Provisions, though fully satisfied, will not transfer the tax
liability away from the grantor since these provisions do not apply
to situations involving an assignment of future income. Each of
these reasons will be considered more fully hereafter.
IV. CASES BEARING ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME GENERALLY
Without attempting to cover the multitude of cases on this prob-
lem, it is usual to begin with Lucas v. Earl,"6 a recognized classic
which was cited in the two main sources upon which the Service
must have relied, viz., the Committee Reports and the Lake case. In
the Lucas case, Earl and his wife entered into a contract whereby
they agreed that any property either of them owned or thereafter
acquired, including earnings and salaries, would be owned by them
as joint tenants. Thereafter, the question arose as to who was taxable
on salaries earned by Earl. The Court cited the controlling statute"'
defining income and stated its holding as follows:
"Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c) (1956).
25S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 365 (1954).
26281 U.S. 111 (1930).
"'The Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(a).
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There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned
them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory
arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the
salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned
it. That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think
that no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to
the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree
from that on which they grew.
This language was the first statement of the "tree and fruit" doc-
trine. This often quoted principal has not been seriously questioned
since that time. However, the avoidance of this problem is not, of
itself, necessarily decisive where transfers in trust are involved.29
A case which, by way of contrast, is very important is that of
Blair v. Commissioner." The taxpayer, a life income beneficiary of a
testamentary trust, made certain donative assignments of a portion
of the income from the trust for the remainder of his life to certain
donees. The Commissioner argued that the income received by the
donees was taxable to the donor, citing Lucas v. Earl, among others,
as controlling. The Supreme Court stated that these cases were not
in point, that the tax here is not upon earnings which are taxed to
the one who earns them, that there was no question of evasion or
of the taxpayer's retention of control, but that the tax in this case
is upon income which, under the general application of the revenue
acts, attaches to ownership. The Court carefully pointed out that
the taxpayer was the owner of an equitable interest in the corpus
which entitled him to enforce the trust, to enjoin a breach of trust,
to obtain redress in case of a breach, and to alienate his interest like
any other present interest in property." This decision must be con-
sidered in any attempt to decide whether a given transaction is a
transfer of a substantial property interest or a mere assignment of
income.
In Helvering v. Horst"2 the donor taxpayer detached interest cou-
pons from bonds prior to their maturity and gave them to his son,
who received the income therefrom. In holding that the income was
taxable to the donor, the Court said:
Nor is it perceived that there is any adequate basis for distinguishing
between the gift of interest coupons here and a gift of salary or com-
missions. . . . When, by the gift of the coupons, he has separated his
8 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
" The transfer must also be for a substantial duration. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312
U.S. 579 (1941).30300 U.S. $ (1937).
31 Id. at 13.
32311 U.S. 112 (1940).
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right to interest payments from his investment and procured the pay-
ment of the interest to his donee, he has enjoyed the economic benefits
of the income in the same manner and to the same extent as though
the transfer were of earnings, and in both cases the import of the
statute is that the fruit is not to be attributed to a different tree from
that on which it grew."
This case was likewise cited by both the Committee Reports and
the Lake case.
Another case which must be considered in this regard is Harrison
v. Schaffner." In this case a life beneficiary assigned a portion of
the income from a trust to her children for one year. The Court had
no difficulty distinguishing this case from Blair and holding the as-
signor taxable on the income received by the assignees." In other
words, the transfer of an interest for the life of the grantor will
carry with it the income tax burden, but the transfer of such an
interest for one year will not.
These, then, are the landmark cases which are recognized as con-
trolling. How would they apply to the problem under consideration?
First, the facts of Lucas v. Earl are far removed from our situation.
Salary is always ordinary income taxable to the person who earns it.
Therefore, this case is not actually in point, since in the problem
under discussion the grantor proposed to transfer all of his interest
in the mineral properties to the trust. However, the "tree and fruit"
doctrine does apply and is a valid test. Consequently, if the tax-
payer in question had assigned only the fruit, he would be taxed
on the income as it arises. Our taxpayer not only proposed to assign
the tree to the trust, but because of the peculiar nature of this prop-
erty, the beneficiary would also receive part of the tree. This, then,
goes beyond the requirements of the "tree and fruit" doctrine."
In the Horst case, there was, again, a situation that is not at all in
33Id. at 120.
"4312 U.S. 579 (1941).
5Id. at 582.58 For example, the assignment of stocks and bonds to a trust which satisfies the pro-
visions of §§ 671-78, or in lieu thereof, the "bundle of rights" rule under prior law, would
shift the income therefrom to the trust beneficiary with all of the stocks and bonds
returning in full to the grantor at the end of the term. For discussion see Cleary, supra
note 13, at 744; Craven, supra note 1, at 905; Holland, Kennedy, Surrey, and Warren,
supra note 13, at 363.
To change this example, then, to the transfer of a mineral interest (which if sold at
a gain would, like the stocks and bonds, be subject to the capital gains provisions) should
result in the same treatment; the only difference being that the grantor will not get all
his tree back, since the oil produced is itself part of the tree. To compensate for this
fact, most state laws require that unless the grantor expressly provides otherwise, the de-
pletion allowance on a wasting asset held in trust shall not be distributed to the income
beneficiary, but a portion of the income shall be retained by the trustee as corpus. 3 Scott,
Trusts § 239, at 1856 (2d ed. 1956); see, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 175.33 (1949).
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point. Clearly, Mr. Horst transferred only the fruit (interest cou-
pons) and not the tree (the bonds). In the problem being consid-
ered, the taxpayer proposed to transfer both the tree and fruit at
the same time (this is always the case where a wasting asset is in-
volved), and he would only receive back the part of the asset re-
maining when the trust terminated. However, it should be noted
that had Mr. Horst transferred the bonds with the interest coupons
attached in trust for ten years, assuming the Grantor Trusts Pro-
visions were otherwise satisfied, the income from the coupons as they
matured would be taxable to the beneficiary under present law."
Under prior case law, the Clifford Regulations, and the 1954
Code, the fact that both the "tree and fruit" were transferred would
not place the income tax burden upon the donee unless the transfer
of the property was for a substantial length of time. This concept
was early espoused in the Schaffner case, which was also cited in the
Lake case and in the Committee Reports under section 671. Al-
though this test is pertinent, clearly our facts are distinguishable
since the term of the trust was for ten years or the life of the bene-
ficiary, whichever was less, and this would satisfy the test under the
1954 Code and probably under prior law. 8
In Schaffner the Court was very careful to point out that a gift
for a day, month, or year was taxable to the donor, but that income
from the assignment of a life interest in trust was taxable to the
donee. Thus, the facts in Schaffner are also clearly distinguishable
from those in the Blair case."9 Certainly, if Schaffner had been per-
mitted to prevail, there would be serious erosion of the tax base since
all one would need do to avoid the receipt of income for a year
would be to transfer the right to that income for that year. How-
ever, this was not the case under Blair. There, the Court believed,
and rightly so, that a substantial, long-term interest had been trans-
ferred. The distinguishing feature between the two cases was that
under Blair the term was substantial so that the erosion factor was
not present."'
In Farkas v. Commissioner" the taxpayer, a beneficiary of a testa-
mentary trust, transferred all his interest therein to a trust which
would terminate after ten years or upon the death of his brother,
whichever occurred first. The income from the trust was payable to
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 671-81.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 673 (a), (c). See also 6 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 13,
at § 37.39.
"Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 582 (1941).
4'See Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 382 (1944).
4' 170 F.2d 201 (5th Cit. 1948).
[Vol. 14
SHORT-TERM TRUSTS
the brother. The court stated that the fact the thing assigned could
revert to the settlor upon the brother's death, standing alone, would
not render the income taxable to the settlor. The court then empha-
sized that the taxpayer had assigned a substantial, equitable interest
in property and was not taxable on the income therefrom, citing
Blair as controlling. The court also stated that the settlor had re-
tained no control which would require the application of the Clifford
doctrine. The judge in the concurring opinion pointed out that the
Clifford Regulations, enacted after the years in question, added con-
clusive support to the determination, saying:
They do this by fixing for the future the line within which, though
assigned, trust income is taxable to the grantor as substantial owner
thereof at within ten years "commencing with the date of the transfer",
thus extending protection to assignments, the duration of which is
almost, if not quite, identical with that of the assignment in this case. 2
Although the majority opinion is unquestionably accurate, the con-
curring opinion illustrates the belief that if the transfer to a short-
term trust satisfied the Clifford Regulations, the forerunner to the
1954 Code provisions, the grantor would not be taxed on the income
during the term.
The Committee Reports do not mention the Blair case when citing
the circumstances to which the Grantor Trusts Provisions would
not apply, nor has the Service had any question as to the applicabil-
ity of that case where grantors have transferred long-term interests
into trust. In Revenue Ruling 55-3843 it was held that if a life
income beneficiary of a trust assigned the trust income irrevocably
for more than ten years, such income would be taxable to the as-
signee. This was the case of an assignment of pure income, but the
duration of the assignment was sufficient to give the assignee such
substantial rights therein that under the Blair decision it was consid-
ered adequate to shift the tax burden from the trust beneficiary to
the assignee. The Service has also ruled that where two children trans-
ferred income-producing property to their mother for her life, re-
serving the remainder, the children were not taxable upon the income
therefrom during the life of their mother."
It would seem from the above discussion that the Service is on un-
sound ground in arguing that Congress intended to exclude the
transfer by a grantor of all of his mineral interest, in trust, while
retaining a reversionary interest, from the provisions of sections 671-
4 Id. at 204.
43 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 389.
44 Rev. Rul. 56-221, 1956-1 Cur. Bull. 58.
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78."' The cases referred to above demonstrate that the Service would
also be on unsound ground in its holding under prior law even if
the 1954 Code provisions did not apply.
V. THE CLIFFORD PROBLEM AND THE GRANTOR
TRUSTS PROVISIONS
Probably no other case in all of the tax law has received more
comment, been less satisfactory, or engendered more litigation than
that of Helvering v. Clifford."0 It has been said that a decision under
the Clifford Rules has no more value as binding precedent than a
decision in an average negligence suit, that the court was indulging
in judicial legislation, and that the court failed to lay down any
standards or guides of conduct for the taxpayer."'
Under the facts, Mr. Clifford set up a trust, funded with certain
securities he owned, for a term of five years, or the death of his wife
or himself, whichever first occurred, with the undistributed net in-
come payable to the wife or her estate as her absolute property upon
termination. Mr. Clifford, as trustee, had absolute discretion in de-
ciding how much income, if any, would be distributed each year
and had broad powers, including the right to vote, sell, invest, and
exchange the stock. It was stipulated that the tax effects were not
the sole consideration for the trust, that there was no restriction on
the wife's use of the income she received, and that the trust was not
designed to relieve Mr. Clifford of his obligation of support. The
Supreme Court cited section 22(a) of the 1934 Act defining gross
income as controlling and made the following statement:
Technical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances,
or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may construct as a
refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic issue. That issue is
whether the grantor after the trust has been established may still be
treated, under this statutory scheme, as the owner of the corpus. 8
The Court, in affirming the Board's decision, held that (1) the short
duration of the trust, (2) the fact that the wife was the beneficiary,
and (3) the retention of control over the corpus by the grantor,
led irresistibly to the conclusion that Mr. Clifford continued to be
the owner of the property. In reaching this holding the Court em-
phasized that there was no substantial change in his economic posi-
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
40309 U.S. 331 (1940).
4 6 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 13, at S 37.39; Greenberger, supra note 13, at 166;
Nance, Taxation of Trust Income to Grantors and Others as Substantial Owners of the
Property, 33 Taxes 899 (1955).
48 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
[Vol. 14
SHORT-TERM TRUSTS
tion due to his dominion and control over the property, and al-
though no one fact is normally decisive, where the benefits directly
or indirectly retained blend so imperceptibly with the normal con-
cepts of full ownership, the income must be taxed to Mr. Clifford.
The Court further indicated that since Congress did not adopt any
rule to determine this problem, it would be a question of fact in each
case whether the grantor remains the owner and hence subject to
the tax on the income. 9
The language used by the Court in Clifford has since been said
to establish a "bundle of rights" test for these cases. If too many
"rights" are retained, the grantor remains the owner for tax pur-
poses; if not, the trust or beneficiary bears the tax." For five years
the battle raged to determine how small this "bundle" must be
before the grantor could successfully deflect the tax liability, until
a truce was presented in the form of the Clifford Regulations.
Another item of significance must be pointed out which may
clarify the Service's position. The Court in the Clifford case specifi-
cally stated that in view of the result reached there was no
need to examine the contention that the trust device fell within
the rule of Lucas v. Earl, relating to the assignment of future in-
come. This illustrates a principle which is often confused. First, the
Clifford case was not decided on the ground that the taxpayer as-
signed the income. The only question decided by the Court was
whether Mr. Clifford remained the owner of the securities by virtue
of the "bundle of rights" he retained.' Second, the Clifford case
differs from the Blair case in that the question under the latter
decision was whether Mr. Blair had anticipatorily assigned his right
to receive future income. The Court was not concerned with whether
Mr. Blair remained the substantial owner of the interest assigned by
reason of his retention of control and the other factors involved
in the Clifford case. This aspect would appear very important to
the Service's view that the Grantor Trusts Provisions do not apply
to the assignment of income problem.
Section 671 provides that no items of a trust shall be included
in computing the taxable income and credits of the grantor or
any other person solely on the grounds of his dominion and control
over the trust, except as specified in this subpart." The Congressional
9Id. at 3 38.
5 Cleary, supra note 13, at 744.
" Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 338 (1940).
" For an excellent discussion of the technical requirements under the Grantor Trusts
Provisions see Yohlin, The Short-Term Trust-A Respectable Tax-Saving Device, 14 Tax
L. Rev. 109, 123 (1958).
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intent in enacting this provision is, in turn, explained in the Com-
mittee Reports as follows:
The effect of this provision is to insure that taxability of Clifford type
trusts shall be governed solely by this subpart. However, this pro-
vision does not affect the principles governing the taxability of income
to a grantor or assignor other than by reason of his dominion and con-
trol over the trust."
The Committee Reports further state that the subpart has no ap-
plication in situations involving assignments of future income as in
the Earl, Schaffner, and Horst cases. This points up the dilemma
considered herein very precisely. If the question presented is whether
the grantor remains the substantial owner as in Clifford because he
has retained an equivalent "bundle of rights," the question shall
be answered under sections 671-78 without regard to the hodge-
podge of prior law on the subject. 4 If the situation involves an
assignment of future income as in Earl, Schaffner, or Horst, sections
671-78 have no application to that problem. This must mean that
the fact that interest coupons or salary rights are transferred into
a trust for ten years, which satisfies all the statutory requirements,
is not, of itself, determinative that this transaction is not an as-
signment of income taxable to the grantor. In other words, Con-
gress did not intend to establish an arbitrary test which would afford
a basis by which it could be argued that the transfer of rights to
salary or interest payments in conformity with the Grantor Trusts
Provisions would pass the tax liability to the beneficiary.
This analysis points up the ambiguity in the Committee Reports
and appears to lend support to the Service's position that the Grantor
Trusts Provisions have no application since the Service is not arguing
dominion and control but the assignment of income question. How-
ever, Congress specifically pointed out the types of income transfers
to which these provisions were inapplicable. In reality every transfer
to a short-term trust involves a transfer of income since the grantor
gets back his corpus on termination. 5 Consequently, if the Service's
view is correct, the Service could foreclose the application of the
statutes in every instance merely by raising the assignment of income
question. The discrepancy in this position can be easily illustrated. For
example, if Mr. Clifford, after the effective date of the 1954 Code,
were to transfer his securities into a short-term trust which satisfied
53 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 365 (1954).
5' Mansfield, Short-Term Trusts and the Clifford Rules, N.Y.U. 15th Annual Inst. on
Fed. Tax. 837, 838 (1957); Wickersham, Short Term and Controlled Trusts, N.Y.U. 14th
Annual Inst. on Fed. Tax. 479, 480 (1956).
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 673.
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the Grantor Trusts Provisions while retaining a reversionary interest,
the fact that the Service could again raise the assignment of income
question, as they did in the initial case, should not make these pro-
visions any less controlling. In discussing section 671, Congress em-
phasized that the effect of this provision is to insure that the taxa-
bility of Clifford type trusts shall be governed solely by the Grantor
Trusts Provisions."s This must mean that the Service cannot avoid
the controlling effect of these statutory provisions merely by raising
the assignment of income question.
The questionable validity of the Service's position on this problem
can best be illustrated by looking at the provisions of section 673
(b). There, Congress provided that a grantor would not be con-
sidered the owner of any portion of a trust in which he has a rever-
sionary interest to the extent the income of any such portion is
irrevocably payable for a period of two years to certain enumerated
types of charitable beneficiaries.' The reason Congress pointed this
out so clearly was to avoid the Schaffner problem. In the absence of
a statute, such a transfer would have been of too short a term, the
interest transferred too insubstantial, to shift the income tax burden
to the donee." However, Congress felt the charitable motives im-
portant enough to write in this specific exception, permitting, in
effect, the assignment of income in this fashion. This illustrates that
Congress did provide an arbitrary test on the assignment of income
question in these provisions and tends to refute the Service's inter-
pretation of the Committee Reports to the contrary.'
An additional illustration of the questionableness of the Service's
position can be seen by the fact that the statute also permits the
term to depend on the life of the donee."° This is permissible regard-
less of the life expectancy of the donee. For example, if the donee's
5 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 365 (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong.
2d Sess. A 212 (1954). For an excellent analysis in this regard, see Greenberger, supra
note 13, at 168.
"€See Sneed, The Economic Interest-An Expanding Concept, 35 Texas L. Rev. 307,
356 (1957); Yohlin, supra note 52, at 116.
" Harrison v. Shaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941). But see Helvering v. Bok, 132 F.2d
365 (3d Cir. 1942); Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954); Estate of M. M. Cook, 27
B.T.A. 33 (1932). For a case decided since the Lake decision, see Eugene T. Flewellen,
32 T.C. 317 (1959).
5a To be consistent with its holding on the requested ruling, the Service, it would
seem, must also rule that the transfer of any mineral interest to a two year trust for a
qualified charity, with reversion in the grantor, would not relieve the grantor from the
tax liability on the income received by the charity. Such a position would appear in-
congruous since any other property so transferred would, in the absence of § 673 (b),
probably be considered a mere attempt to assign income, and the grantor would not avoid
the tax. See for discussion authorities cited in note 58 supra.
60lot. Rev. Code of 1954, § 673(c).
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life expectancy is only one year, the trust could still satisfy the
statutory requirements and the income would be taxed to the donee.
Consequently, under this example, the grantor's mineral interest
must have a life of less than one year under the Service's view,
which would again negative the application of the statute and the
intent of Congress in enacting it. This intent is clearly evident from
the following language in the Committee Reports concerning sec-
tion 673:
Subsection (c) contains a further exception . . . to the effect that the
grantor shall not be treated as the owner of a trust by reason of a
reversionary interest where such interest is to take effect only on the
death of the person or persons to whom the income is payable. This
rule is applicable even though, due to the short life expectancy of the
beneficiary, the reversionary interest may reasonably be expected to
take effect within 10 years.61
If the interest transferred will be exhausted before the trust ter-
minates, the grantor has no reversion and has given away all his
interest in the property, which would relieve him from the income
tax liability without regard to this statutory provision. This statu-
tory exception was unnecessary if the Grantor Trusts Provisions only
applied to a gift of the total interest. For this reason, it is difficult
to see the validity of the Service's position that there must be no
reversion of the mineral interest transferred since the statement
of congressional intent in enacting these sections contains no such
exception, but to the contrary, specifically permits reversions with-
out limitation as to the kind of property held by the trust.
VI. THE CARVED-OUT OIL PAYMENT
Since the Service stated that under the facts of the requested
ruling the transfer by the taxpayer of all his mineral interest in
trust with a reversion to him after the term was essentially equivalent
to a carved-out oil payment, some review of the carved-out oil
payment question would be advisable. This question was early raised
in G.C.M. 248492 where the Service stated that assignments of in-oil
payment rights by owners which were carved out of economic in-
terests held by them were essentially, with respect to the assignor,
mere assignments of expected income from such property. The Ser-
vice reasoned that this was similar to the receipt of a cash bonus
by a lessor, the assignment of the right to future dividends by a
stockholder, or the assignment of income rights by the earner. This
61 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 366, 367 (1954).
62 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 66.
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was the result even though it was stated that the assignee of the
carved-out oil payment had a depletable economic interest in the
oil and gas in place, which was potentially a capital asset. The Ser-
vice pointed out that such carved-out oil payments ordinarily pay
out within one or two years, and no opinion was expressed as to
in-oil payment rights extending over a substantial portion of the
life of the depletable economic interests from which such rights
are carved. Three years later the Service ruled that donative assign-
ments of short-lived in-oil payment rights carved out of any type
of depletable economic interest in oil and gas in place were assign-
ments of future income, taxable to the donor as ordinary income, and
subject to depletion as the income arises. 3 The following year saw
the culmination of this reasoning in I.T. 4003, 4 wherein the Bureau
stated that the assignment of any in-oil payment right (not pledged
for development) which extends over a period less than the life of
the depletable property interest from which it is carved is essentially
the assignment of expected income from such property interest.
In spite of numerous efforts by the Service to convince the judici-
ary of the validity of its position that the assignment of a carved-
out oil payment is not the transfer of a capital asset, but ordinary
income, they were unable to achieve much success until the de-
cision by the Supreme Court in the Lake case.6 Already, we have
the benefit of many excellent writings on this case and the obser-
vations of those among the Bar who have labored over its meaning.'"
63I.T. 3935, 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 39.
641950_1 Cum. Bull. 10, 11.
65Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955); Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C.
1132 (1954); Columbia Oil & Gas Co., 41 B.T.A. 38 (1940), aff'd, 118 F.2d 459 (5th
Cir. 1941); Majestic Oil Corp., 42 B.T.A. 659 (1940); Ortiz Oil Co., 37 B.T.A. 656
(1938), aff'd, 102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 566 (1939); Estate of
M. M. Cook, 27 B.T.A. 33 (1932); cf. Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.
1956); Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956); Rudco Oil & Gas Co.
v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. CI. 1949).
6 From the comments made, it appears the case left more questions unanswered than
were answered. About all that can be said with any degree of confidence after reviewing
the decision is that the transfers of carved-out oil payments with pay out periods of from
22 months to 12 years are not transfers of capital assets, but anticipatory assignments of
income. Bruen, Federal Income Tax Aspects of Oil and Gas Ventures-A Summary for
the Investor, 14 Tax L. Rev. 505, 521 (1959); Haskell, Exchanges of Oil and Gas Prop-
erties, P-H Oil & Gas Taxes 5 1071; McClure, Effect of Supreme Court Decision in
Commissioner v. P.G. Lake on Transfers of Production Payments, VII Oil & Gas Tax
Q. 245 (1958); Patterson, Carved-Out Oil Payments, P-H Oil & Gas Taxes 5 1051;
Peck, Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Taxation, Southwestern Legal Foundation 10th
Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 421 (1959); Schoenbaum, Substance and Form
in Assignments of In-Oil Rights and Other Mineral Interests, N.Y.U. 17th Annual
Inst. on Fed. Tax. 443 (1959); Simon, Supreme Court Says No to Capital Gains Treat-
ment of Carved-Out Oil Payments, 37 Taxes 61 (1959); Sneed, Another Look at the
Economic Interest Concept, Southwestern Legal Foundation 10th Annual Inst. on Oil
& Gas L. & Tax. 353, 373 (1959); Variable Oil Payment, IX Oil & Gas Tax Q. 57
(1960); Note, 10 J. Taxation 27 (1959); Recent Case Note, 12 Sw. L.J. 396 (1958).
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The principal question involved in Lake was whether the con-
sideration for the assignments, which admittedly was taxable to the
assignors, was to be taxed at capital gains or ordinary income rates.
For this reason, it was unfortunate that the court, in citing I.T.
4003, also included the portion dealing with the donative assign-
ment of oil payments. Since the donative assignment problem con-
cerns the question of who pays the tax, and not whether there has
been a conversion of a capital asset, it was totally unrelated to the
question for decision and was mere dicta. However, this dicta be-
comes more palatable when it is realized that three of the principal
cases relied upon by the court in the Lake case were carefully dis-
tinguished by the courts deciding them from the facts existing under
the Blair decision, which did involve a donative transfer. In fact,
the Court in Helvering v. Horst (which was relied upon heavily by
the Court in Lake), in distinguishing its facts from the Blair case,
had this to say:
Since the gift was deemed to be a gift of the property, the income
from it was held to be the income of the owner of the property, who
was the donee, not the donor-a refinement which was unnecessary
if respondent's contention here is right, but one clearly inapplicable to
gifts of interest or wages. Unlike income thus derived from an obli-
gation to pay interest or compensation, the income of the trust was
regarded as no more the income of the donor than would be the rent
from a lease or a crop raised on a farm after the leasehold or the
farm had been given away. 7
This would indicate that the Lake case should not affect the efficacy
of the Blair decision or any other donative transfer where income-
producing property is transferred and the term of the transfer is
substantial.
Lake did not involve a donative transfer in trust, the 1954 Code
provisions, or the assignment by a taxpayer of all his mineral interest
as distinguished from a carved-out oil payment. For these reasons,
it is not determinative where the taxpayer assigns all his mineral
interest to a short-term trust, retaining a reversionary interest as
permitted by statute.
VII. THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
The crux of the problem considered herein is the determination
that the proposed transfer in the requested ruling was equivalent
to an oil payment. For this reason, it would appear necessary to
examine the question of what constitutes an oil payment.
67311 U.S. 112, 118-119 (1940).
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The Supreme Court has defined an oil payment as "the right to
a specified sum of money, payable out of a specified percentage of
the oil, or the proceeds received from the sale of such oil, if, as and
when produced .. ." An oil payment has also been defined as a
right to oil and gas in place which entitles its owner to a specified
fraction of production for a limited period of time, or until a speci-
fied sum of money or a specified number of units of oil or gas have
been received."9
In-oil payment rights were defined in G.C.M. 24849 as follows:
Such rights entitle the assignee to oil or gas produced, or the pro-
ceeds derived from an agreed share of production, if, as, and when pro-
duced, until a fixed or determinable amount of oil or gas, or an ascer-
tainable sum of money, has been received.7"
Nevertheless, in the requested ruling, the Service, in effect, held that
the assignment by a taxpayer of his entire mineral interest, in trust,
for a term which was less than the life of the depletable property
transferred was a carved-out oil payment.
Normally an oil payment is created when a mineral owner trans-
fers a right to receive a specified sum of money or a specified quan-
tity of oil or gas payable out of a specified percentage of produc-
tion. Most of the litigated cases have involved this type of oil pay-
ment.71 This type of transfer is clearly within the Supreme Court's
definition and has never been hard to classify. Likewise, it has been
held that an oil payment results where the owner transfers half
of his mineral interest to another until the transferee has received
a specified sum of money."2 This type of transfer would also be
classified as an oil payment under the above definitions.
Apparently no one has seriously questioned the definitions which
have been utilized to determine if an oil payment exists. This is
because in the decided cases the transfers would have been classified
as oil payments under any one of the above definitions. The prin-
"SAnderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 410 (1940). See also Heard, Income Tax
Treatment of Production Payments, Southwestern Legal Foundation 8th Annual Inst. on
Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 563, 564 (1957); Ray, Problems of the Oil and Gas Industry: As-
signment of In-Oil Payment Rights, N.Y.U. 9th Annual Inst. on Fed. Tax. 505, 506
(1951).
69 Breeding and Burton, Taxation of Oil and Gas Income § 6.01 (1954); Appleman,
Exchanges of Properties of Like Kind in the Oil Business, N.Y.U. 11th Annual Inst. on
Fed. Tax. 273, 279 (1953); Krystal, Tax Consequences of Lease Transactions, P-H Oil
& Gas Taxes 55 1101, 1107; Patterson, Carved-Out Oil Payments, P-H Oil & Gas Taxes
5 1051; Rowen, Introduction to Oil and Gas Interests, 34 Taxes 19, 21 (1956).
70 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 66.
" Cases cited note 65 supra.
' Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. Cl. 1949); Estate of
M. M. Cook, 27 B.T.A. 33 (1932).
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cipal use of the term "oil payment" was to describe an interest,
the duration of which was not coextensive with the producing life
of the property from which it was payable, so as to distinguish it
from a royalty interest. The question involved in the cases usually
was whether the owner who assigned an oil payment out of a larger
mineral interest retained by him would be taxed at capital gains
or ordinary income rates."
The Service appears to have broadened the definition of what
constitutes an oil payment considerably. The cases and statutes per-
mit an owner to make a donative transfer in trust of his income-
producing property for a substantial term and thereby transfer the
tax liability on the income produced during the term to the trans-
feree. 4 The validity of this concept is elementary in the tax law
and applies to the transfer of all income-producing property." The
Service, nevertheless, has said that if the property transferred is a
mineral property, this is equivalent to the carving out of an oil
payment if the life of the property transferred will exceed the term,
and is an assignment of income taxable to the assignor. In other
words, under the Service's view, the assignor of a mineral interest
would have to give all his interest away in order to avoid the income
tax on the income received by the transferee. This would place the
owner of a mineral property in a unique position, indeed, under
prevailing legal theory.
The fallacy of this position can be illustrated by one of the Ser-
vice's own examples. The Service has likened the carved-out oil
payment to the assignment of the right to future dividends on
stock without transferring the stock itself and hence an assign-
ment of income." Since the owner of the stock could transfer the
stock for a substantial term which would also transfer the tax liabili-
ty on the dividends accruing during the term to the transferee,"
the mineral owner should be able to transfer his income-producing
mineral property with like results if the analogy chosen by the Ser-
vice is a true one. This would seem to indicate either that perhaps
the definition of an oil payment should be restricted to that pro-
nounced by the Supreme Court or that there cannot be a carving-
out of an oil payment where all the income-producing mineral in-
" Cases cited note 65 supra. See also Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260
(1958).
74 See pp. 495-96 supra; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S§ 671-81.
71 See note I supra.
76 G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 66, 68.7 7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 671-78.
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terest owned by the grantor is transferred in trust for a substan-
tial term."'
Apparently the Service is bothered here because the beneficiary
receives the same income whether the grantor transfers an oil pay-
ment, in fact, or the entire mineral property for the term, and the
grantor may well have the same mineral interest after the term
regardless of which approach is taken. What the Service possibly
fails to realize is that this is true where any income-producing pro-
perty is transferred to a short-term trust. All the beneficiary nor-
mally receives is the income and the corpus reverts to the grantor.
The law permits the grantor to escape the tax on the income during
the term if he transfers his income-producing property; if he only
assigns the right to dividends or interest, he is taxed on the income.
The results may be equivalent in either event, but the statutes and
case law make a distinction which the Service has seen fit to ignore
in this instance.
Under the facts upon which the ruling was requested, as stated
above,79 the grantor conveyed all his mineral interest to the trust
which satisfied the Grantor Trusts Provisions. The beneficiary had
a right to all the income from the trust which was indefinite in
amount and not a specified sum or the income from a specified
percentage of production. There was no monetary limit or any
limit other than the term of the trust, which was of substantial
duration and satisfied the statutory requirements. The interest con-
veyed could not be classified as an oil payment under the Supreme
Court's definition as pronounced in the Anderson case and as re-
affirmed in the Lake decision.
If a transfer of all of a grantor's mineral interest into a trust
which satisfies the Grantor Trusts Provisions is not a carved-out
production payment, the assignment of income question never arises
and the Grantor Trusts Provisions clearly control. If it is a carved-
out production payment, then it must be decided if it is an assign-
" To further illustrate, if the grantor were to transfer the right to receive a specific
amount of money payable out of production from mineral property to a trust, this might
be said to be analogous to the transfer of interest coupons without transferring the bonds.
See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 267 (1958). However, if the grantor
transfers the entire mineral interest for a substantial term (at least ten years), this is
analogous to the transfer of stock, which would also transfer the tax liability on the
income to the transferee receiving the income. Whether the grantor transfers stock or all
his mineral interest, the beneficiary of the trust has an equitable interest in the corpus
which entitles him to enforce the trust, to enjoin a breach of trust, to obtain redress in
case of a breach, and to alienate his interest like any other present interest in property.
Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 13 (1937). It would, therefore, appear unrealistic to
say that the transfer of the entire mineral interest in trust would be any more equivalent
to a production payment than the transfer of stock under similar facts.
79 See pp. 496-97; see also authorities cited in note 17 supra.
1960]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ment of income taxable to the grantor, a transfer of a property
interest within the Grantor Trusts Provisions with the income tax-
able to the donee, or a transfer of a substantial property interest
under prior trust cases and taxable to the donee. For these reasons,
a judicial determination of the definitional problem as applied to
the facts of the proposed ruling would be helpful.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It would appear from the foregoing that the position taken in
the informal ruling either discriminates unfairly against the use of
mineral interests in short-term trusts, or the ambiguity in the
Treasury Regulations under section 671 is being utilized in such a
manner that, if the same position is consistently applied to other
types of property when placed in such trusts, the record of litiga-
tion which was the aftermath of the Clifford decision may well be
exceeded.
The foreclosure of tax avoidance through the assignment of in-
come is important to the country's fiscal structure and warrants
added vigilance on the part of the Service, the Tax Bar, and the
taxpayers to see that the system is not abused by numerous schemes
in that direction. Clearly, if the revenues are to be protected and
if our tax system is to work in an effective, fair, and equitable
manner, the assignment of income problem should be settled. Of
equal importance to the economic well-being of our people is a
healthy, stable climate wherein business and personal planning is
encouraged. With these factors in mind, it is hoped that the Service
will reconsider the position taken in the informal ruling to see if
it is really necessary to subject the short-term trust area to another
round of litigation, regulation, and legislation.
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